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An Incomes Policy for the Professions:
the Dutch Experience
By U. PETER VAN DER HOEK*
ABSTRACT. In 1951 the United States began moving toward an incomes policy,
an attempt to end postwar wage and price inflation by linking changes in these
prices to gains in productivity. Other countries later followed suit; some coun-
tries had already adopted wage and price control policies. The Netherlands
moved toward an incomes policy immediately after World War II. Initially, the
Dutch program involved wages only, but in the 1970s it became an accepted
principle that private professional income should be comparable with the salaries
of government officials and civil servants with comparable training and re-
sponsibilities. In the Netherlands (as in the United States and, before medicine
was socialized, the United Kingdom) health professionals operate on a fee-for-
service basis and their incomes escalated as a result of both inflation and mo-
nopoly power. So they were subjected to the incomes policy. The policy's ef-
fectiveness in curbing income escalation cannot be determined with certainty—
reliable data are lacking. However, the evidence indicates that the policy failed
to achieve its original purpose.
1
Introduction
WHILE THE POSTWAR INCOMES POLICY of the Netherlands has drawn international
attention, judgments about its effectiveness differ widely. Whereas one author
considers the policy to have been useful and beneficial,^ others regard it as a
failure.^ Concerning the effectiveness of the British incomes policy there are
varying views as well.^ In the United States the incomes policy was abandoned
as ineffectual in favor of counter inflationary monetary policies as well as mea-
sures to control the demand, such as health maintenance organizations staffed
by salaried and contractual professionals.
These divergent opinions mark the problem of evaluating an incomes policy:
one can make use of different criteria, depending on the purpose(s) of the
policy. Although price stability or stability of labor costs might be an objective
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of an incomes policy, other goals are possible as well. A more equitable payments
structure, for instance, or improving the structure of payments systems in bar-
gaining processes are examples.**
In this study I do not deal with the Dutch incomes policy as a whole, but
instead with only one aspect of it. In an international context, the Dutch incomes
policy contains a unique feature with reference to policy for professional re-
muneration. This is an almost completely neglected subject in the English lan-
guage literature about the Dutch incomes policy and labor relations.^
The Dutch government seeks to subject the professions^ to an incomes policy
for two primary reasons. First, in Dutch politics it is a widely accepted opinion
that an incomes policy should be a comprehensive one: all incomes should be
involved- Second, the existence of State regulated entry to the professions gives
those professions market power and implies the need for State regulation of
income. Especially because of the latter, the Dutch incomes policy concerning
the professions can be seen as a case study of the struggle between private
interests and the general public interest.^
The first attempts to develop an incomes policy for the professions in the
Netherlands came at the end of 1971. Since that time, regular consultations have
been held between the Dutch government and representatives of the professional
bodies. The government emphasized the need to develop a coherent and in-
tegrated incomes policy and the desirability of more public understanding about
the labor element of professional earnings.^ In 1974 these consultations resulted
in the publication of a report, drafted by a working group,^ pointing out that
there are three main differences between wage earners and the self-employed:
(1) a difference in legal status (2) a difference in socioeconomic position and
(3) a difference in pension rights. The working group recommended an inves-
tigation or inquiry into the 1972 incomes ofthe professions.
The consultations with the professional bodies about the way to carry out this
inquiry did not progress smoothly. On the contrary, so many questions were
raised that the inquiry forms could not be sent out until 1977. The consultations
about the presentation of the results of the inquiry progressed equally laboriously,
so that the results could not be published until 1981. Meanwhile the 1972 data
had become obsolete and the inquiry '^s results were no longer relevant to an
incomes policy for 1981 and later. Thus the value of the inquiry should be
sought in its methodology.
In this study the current state of affairs concerning the Dutch incomes policy
for the professions is examined. First, I shall present an inventory ofthe barriers
to entry for the professions, because these barriers to entry—or (more generally)
regulations—are one ofthe primary reasons for government intervention. Sec-
ond, I shall focus on the "acceptable income level" and its separate elements.
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Finally, I shall discuss the policy the government has pursued concerning the
incomes of the professions.
II
Regulations Governing Entry to the Professions
IN 1975 THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT published a note about the incomes policy
containing a brief review of the remuneration structure of the professions. It
stated that in pursuing an incomes policy for the professions, it should obviously
consider the fee representing the value of the labor services provided. This
would be in connection with (and follow naturally from) the more general wage
policy being pursued. Furthermore the Government stated that the integration
of the professions into a comprehensive incomes policy is hindered by a lack
of concrete information about fees and sufficient data concerning the level, the
growth and the spread of the professional incomes. This integration is also
hampered by the protected market positions of the professions brought about
by the entry barriers. Moreover, and related to entry barriers, the Government
considers the policy of the professions to accept or not to accept a patient or a
client to be a distortion of normal market structure.^ *^
The control of entry exercised by the professions is in fact a restriction upon
entry. Two elements compose this barrier. Generally, the occupational training
forms a high threshold for potential entrants, the more so as the number of
training facilities (especially for certain professions in the health care sector)
is limited. Moreover, there are more or less formal regulations in force con-
cerning the requirements for establishing production facilities. In the following
1 shall review briefly these regulations for each professional category.
The most rigorous establishment regulations refer to public notaries, an oc-
cupation devoted to providing stated legal services. In this matter the professional
group plays an important role, although the final word in regard to the admission
of candidates to the ranks of the public notaries rests with the Minister of Justice.
This official decides upon the succession of and change in the number of posts.
Referring to the real estate part of the services of public notaries, price com-
petition is ruled out through uniform fees/^ whereas for other documents min-
imum fees are in force. By far the greatest part of the notary services is dictated
by law and reserved to public notaries. Third party competition comes only
from business advisors, namely from legal administrative professions such as
solicitors, tax consultants, and registered accountants.
Solicitors possess a monopoly in legal actions; representation by a solicitor
is required in legal proceedings. This can be described as the obligation of a
party in a suit to be represented by a university-educated expert who has won
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admission to the practice of the law. There is almost no price competition in
such advocacy. The Dutch Order of Solicitors publishes an advisory fee schedule
consisting of an income component of 60% and a cost component of 40% (of
which 20% is personal cost and 20% other cost). However, the differences among
fees are not clear. This is because individual solicitors set fees in proportion to
(1) the importance of the case (usually expressed in money terms), (2) the
degree of difficulty of the case and (3) the time spent on the case.
For registered accountantszn important domain is reserved through the Reg-
istered Accountant Act. The requirement that accountants certify the reliability
of the annual accounts of clients as laid down in this law enables the registered
accountants to build up a relationship of trust, with the possibility of further
advisory practice. However, the most important regulation concerning profes-
sional entry is the required training. Because the tariffs of registered accountants
are not published and because bills are rarely itemized, fee structures are un-
known and price competition is limited.
The technical professions (town-planning experts, construction engineers
(professional engineers), interior architects, landscape gardeners stnd con-
sulting engineers) show many similarities. While in principle entry is free, in
practice the vocational training forms an important entry regulation, as it screens
out all but the most highly educated groups. Mutual competition exists, but
mainly in the shape of quality competition and far less in the form of price
competition.
The protection of the position of real estate agents is limited to the titles of
real estate agent or broker and related words (like brokerage). Restrictions to
entry to the occupations of broker or agent in real estate do not exist. Anybody
can set up as an intermediary in real estate without any condition other than
entering one's name in the Chamber of Commerce. Three conditions must be
met to be eligible for swearing-in by a court of law, and consequently to be
permitted to bear the title of real estate broker or agent: (1) the candidate has
to be well-reputed; (2) no circumstances may stand in the way of a proper and
independent pursuit of brokerage activities; and (3) the candidate has to be
capable of doing the work. To what extent the title of real estate agent or broker
is essential to be successful is hard to say. The brokerage activity has more to
do with a fluctuating market than most other professions. This produces signif-
icant changes in the volume of the transactions and in the fees charged (the
latter because they are related to the amounts of the transactions). Price com-
petition is limited, owing to the application of uniform fees by the brokers^
most of whom are members of the Dutch Association of Real Estate Agents.
The professions in the health care sector form a distinctive group for want of
market competition. There are no close substitutes, so third party competition
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is lacking. Moreover, price competition is also absent because of government
intervention under authority of the Health Care Fees Act. Also, the relation
between price and consumption has been affected by health insurance. In many
cases the patient even does not know the price of the medical service he is
receiving because the supplier often bills the insurer directly. Entry regulations
occur both in the sphere of professional training and through title and profession
protection. More or less formal restrictions for establishing a practice are in
force concerning general practitioners, medical specialists and pharmaceutical
chemists (e^. in the form of arrangements for mutually accommodating client
needs for services during non office hours, which arrangements are indispensable
for the actual prosecution of the profession).
Ill
Standard Incomes in the Professions
THUS IT IS CLEAR that market competition is limited in all of the above cases,
though to differing degree. Imperfect competition in the market can result in
excessive prices and thus in excessive incomes. In the past, the Dutch Govern-
ment has emphasized that the primary incomes of the professions are made up
of three elements: a compensation for the labor involved, a calculated interest
on the working capital, and a reward for the entrepreneurial achievement.
As a rule these elements are combined in one stated fee, but the Dutch Gov-
ernment stated in the note of 1975 that they should be separated within the
framework of a price policy analogous to the policy pursued in other sectors.
This ruling was consistent with the objectives of the fee policy pursued in the
mid-70s which concluded that: (a) the income component of the fee was per-
mitted to rise no more than the wages of wage earners, and (b) "price behavior
rules" which were applied in the general price policy, were applicable to the
cost component.
At the end of 1975 the Government announced that it would apply these rules
in a strict way, implying that any existing positive guilder residual (a surplus,
after covering practice costs and labor compensation) was not allowed to in-
crease. In 1979, the policy became even more strict in an effort to cut the positive
guilder residuals, and in 1980 the Government announced that all positive guilder
residuals should be eliminated by the end of 1981. Once this goal is attained,
the average income ofthe professional category it concerns equals the so-called
standard income, being a reasonable income from a normative (or political)
point of view as determined by the Government. This rule, it should be noted,
does not apply to individual incomes, but to averages. Hence, within each
profession some inequality of incomes is allowed even if wage and price control
is effective, since some earn less and others more than the standard income.
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An essential element of such a policy is to fix a standard income for each
category of the professions. In 1978 consultations between the Government
and the professional bodies about this level led to provisional agreements, to
be derived from salary scales of comparable civil servants, chosen by means of
job evaluation. The official salary for the private professions is raised by a certain
percentage to express the difference in socioeconomic position and in legal
status between civil servants and the private professions. This positive differential,
mainly concerning differences related to welfare facilities and pension claims,
was fixed at 45% in 1978. However, since that time a method has been developed
to calculate the component parts of the differential, which procedure will allow
for the possibility of different results by professional category. At present, ne-
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Figure 1. Qnlculatlon of Acceptable Income and Fees
gotiations between the government and representatives of professional bodies
are attempting to fix the level of permanent standard incomes.
IV
Implementation of the Standard Income Policy
THE PRICE/INCOMES POLICY concerning the professions has been implemented
initially by promulgating fee decrees for the different professions on the basis
of the Price Control Act. Because of legal actions in 1980, it appeared that this
act could not be used as an instrument for this policy. The National Medical
Specialists Association and four individual medical specialists applied for im-
mediate judgment against the decree as not applying to their professions. The
judge ruled that the Government was not allowed to use the Price Control Act
for redistribution of incomes.
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In response, the Government attempted to solve this problem by inserting
explicitly in the Price Control Act the power to achieve acceptable income
levels for the professions. This was abandoned, however, on the negative advice
of the Council of State. Instead, the Government has chosen (in conformity
with the advice of the Council) a temporary statutory regulation: the Act for the
Standardization of Incomes of the Professions, acquiring force of law in 1981.
This act does not specify the categories of the professions it covers. This re-
sponsibility was assigned to the appropriate Cabinet Minister. Since 1982, the
formal price control over the fees of the professions in the health care sector
has been based on the Health Care Fees Act, but application of the Price Control
Act is still possible, particularly if the economic circumstances require the Gov-
ernment to interfere in the fixing of fees at shorter notice than permitted by the
Health Care Fees Act.
The way Standard Income is calculated and total revenue (income) breaks
down under the (temporary) Act for the Standardization of Incomes of the
Professions is shown in the accompanying figure, where t refers to a certain
year followed by year t + 1. Central to this scheme is the turnover equation:
Total revenue = Fee X Volume = Cost -I- Risk premium + Labor income. The
total revenue and the cost in year t follow from an inquiry or are extrapolated
by means of the results of inquiries set up in previous years. The actual income
from labor in year t follows from subtracting successively the cost in year t
(including a calculated interest on invested capital) and a risk premium attrib-
utable to entrepreneurial activity from the total revenue in year t. Subsequently
the actual income in year t (A )^ is compared with the standard income for that
year (St), taking into account an uncertainty margin, which amounts to 5% at
the moment. The latter implies that a residual exists; positive if A^  > 1.05 St,
negative if A^  < 0.95 St.
If At > 1,05 St, the regulated income in year t + 1 follows from applying a fee
reduction arrangement. This arrangement involves either mandated lower fee
schedules or a mandated lower rate of increase of fee schedules. The final result,
however, might be higher than the standard income because of special circum-
stances or in connection with residuals which according to the Government are
not to be lowered in one year. In these cases, the Government and the law use
the term "acceptable income level."
If At < 0-95 St, the acceptable income level in year t + 1 is to be fixed at the
standard income level for that year. By adding up the expected cost in year t
+ 1 to the acceptable income level in the same year and taking into account an
uncertainty margin again, total revenue in year t + 1 is calculated. Finally, the
fee belonging to the acceptable income level in year t + 1 follows from dividing
total revenue by the volume.
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The Effectiveness of the Incomes Policy
IN PRACTICE the implementation of the policy has been restricted to a limited
number of professions in the health care sector. The other professions mentioned
earlier are not subjected to the incomes policy for at least two main reasons.
First, several professions (especially the technical professions and the registered
accountants) claim to operate in sufficiently competitive markets. Second, the
reluctance of some professional bodies to cooperate, appeared to result in de-
laying tactics concerning the provision of adequate information about the actual
incomes on the one hand and (related to this) the negotiations about acceptable
income levels on the other.
In view of the latter it could be expected that the professional bodies would
often object to the acceptable income levels as proposed by the Government.
In that case the Minister consults a (provisional) advisory committee being
Acceptable
and
profeeslanal category
Table 1.
iDcooie levels for professlooal categories, 1982 - 1984
the coiparable civil servants' salaries, 1984
G^^ceptable iQcooe 1 evel
(Dutch guilders)
1982 1983 1984
coinparabJe d v l l
servants' salary
1984
dental specialists
- for mouth diseases and Jaw su r^
- ln the dentocDaxL 1 lar orthc^jaedy*
phamsLceutical chemLsts
geaaersii practltlcoers
dentlsrts
eqpeech therapists
physlotberaplsts
obstetricians
ly*^ 220.900
^ 219.200
147.300
147.300
135.500
76.800
67.500
64.900
202.700
196.000
147.200
143.600
135.400
76.400
67.400
64.800
192.700
186.000
147.200
143.600
135.000
75.400
67.400
63.900
126.200
126.200
106.100
103.300
97.600
55.200
48.100
46.100
a) The differCTces ln acceptable tncoroe levels Indicate a difference in positive
composed of three members. For example, in 1983 the organizations of general
practitioners, dentists, dental surgeon specialists, physiotherapists, pharmaceu-
tical chemists, obstetricians and speech therapists did object to the Government's
acceptable income levels proposals. Although the Government is urged to con-
sult the provisional Advisory Committee for the Incomes of the Professions in
such a situation, the advice given is not legally binding.
A serious problem is that the comparison of the actual income with the standard
income is hindered by a lack of current and reliable information on the former.
Earlier I drew attention to the length of the elapsed period between the moment
of decision to conduct an inquiry into the incomes of the professions and the
moment of publication. As a result of this long delay, the findings of the inquiry
were no longer relevant to the policy being pursued. As of the beginning of
1984, this situation remained unchanged. According to a letter the Government
Incomes Policy 79
sent to the Parliament, the Government is again consulting with a number of
professional bodies so as to make new estimates.
As an illustration of the problem which the Government confronts, the reg-
ulations were unable to fix acceptable income levels for medical specialists in
1983 and 1984 because of the great uncertainty concerning their actual incomes.
Even though a draft arrangement exists requiring the medical professions to
furnish the relevant income data, the Government concedes that the data col-
lection will continue to be problematic, even if legally required.
The lack of current and reliable information on the actual incomes of the
professions is a serious problem in evaluating the effectiveness of the price/
incomes policy for the professions. Table 1 shows for several professional cat-
egories both the acceptable income levels as fixed in the period 1982-1984 and
the comparable civil servant's salaries in 1984. The majority of the acceptable
income levels shown in this table appears to be fixed consecutively on a lower
level.^^ But whether the actual incomes in 1984 have declined in comparison
to the previous years is not known.
However, it can be observed that judicial problems obviously made it im-
possible to realize the purpose sought in 1980 that all positive residuals should
have disappeared by the end of 1981. The Government itself has admitted that
there were still positive residuals in 1984. In this sense the policy has not been
effective. The response of the professional bodies to the policy in terms of their
reluctance to provide the necessary information can also be interpreted as an
indication of the ineffectiveness of the policy. Thus, the experience gained by
applying the Dutch incomes policy to the professions can be seen as a case
study of the power of private interests to subvert the general public interest.
VI
Concluding Remarks
IN THE NETHERLANDS, it is an accepted principle that private professional income
should be comparable with that of oiEcials and civil servants with comparable
training and responsibilities, Within the framework of the price/incomes policy,
the acceptable income levels for the professions are fixed for each category and
are derived from official salary scales. As Table 1 shows, acceptable income
levels fixed for 1983 and 1984 tend to be lower than in 1982. However, while
the price/incomes policy affects the acceptable income levels of the professions,
there are serious doubts whether the actual 1983 and 1984 incomes of the
professions have declined at the same rate as the acceptable income levels or,
indeed, have declined at all. However, the effectiveness of the price/incomes
policy for the professions cannot be determined with certainty because of a lack
of current and reliable data on the actual incomes of the professions.
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Notes
1. SeeDcJong(1972).p. 156.
2. See Brittan and Lilley (1977), p. 121.
3 This is illustrated in Chater, Dean and Elliott (1981).
4. As pointed out by Biackaby (1972), p. 217.
5. Compare De Wolff (1983); Flanagan, Soskice and Ulman (1983); "Industrial Democracy in
Europe" (IDE) International Research Group (1981), Kennedy (1980), Tinbergen (1975) and
Windmuller (1969).
6. In general terms, professions are characterized by their requirement of intellectual or spe-
cialized skills provided to patients or clients on a personal, direct basis, and hence their practitioners
must have undergone extensive preparatory training. The Minister of Social Affairs formally specifies
which particular professions are subjected to the incomes policy. Other Ministers can be involved
with respect to certain aspects of the implementation of the policy, especially the Minister of
Health Care as far as the professions in the health care sector are concerned. As pointed out in
Section V, practice thus far has shown that in fact only tbe professions in the health care sector
have been subjected to the incomes policy.
7 For il thorough discussion of this topic see Olson (1982).
8 The total remuneration is thought to be composed of a return for the achieved labor, a
calculated interest on the working capital and a reward for the entrepreneurial achievement.
The term labor element refers to the first category".
9. This working group (established in 1972) is made up of representatives of the organizations
of the professions, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministryof Social Affairs and the Central
Bureau ofSiztisiics. The task of this working group was to examine the possibilities of an inquiry
into the labor element of professional earnings, which should make it possible to compare these
earnings with those of comparable wage earners in the Government and the private sector.
10. Although the Government does not clarify the concept of normal market structure, it can
be assumed that a competitive market is meant.
l l . l ! should be noted that these fees are set by the professional body itself.
12 Because these are nominal amounts, the acceptable income levels have declined more in
real terms
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